I am humbled by the fact that the book is already being
hailed as a major contribution to our knowledge not only of the global jihad
movement but of Middle East politics more generally. While I hope such positive
reviews continue, I have three primary goals for this book. First, after four
decades of global jihad, and two decades since the attacks on 9/11, I hope this
book becomes the “go-to” book on global jihad. For anyone who wants to
understand ISIS and al-Qa’ida or similar groups, this is the book they consult
first and perhaps last. I hope that it is seen as the best summary study of
global jihad for students and the general public to read for years to come. It
not only provides the history of global jihad, but also an interpretation of
how to best understand that history.
Second, I would like this book to have an impact on the
discussions in terrorism studies and broader conversations over political
violence concerning the role that the concept of “movements of rage” can play
in understanding certain forms of political violence. Conceptualizing such
anti-Enlightenment groups as forming a movement of rage can help us more
accurately understand the ideologies and organizational structures of such
groups, as well as their likely resort to violence.
Third, this book should have an impact in the policy realm,
where dealing with global jihad groups and other movements of rage is a major
policy concern. Policy makers need to be aware of the variations in global
jihad groups, and they need to understand how the current fourth wave of global
jihad is quite distinctive from earlier waves. Helping to gauge the overall
level of threat from global jihad flows naturally from the concerns in this
book. And, moving beyond global jihad groups, policy makers should be aware of
the concept of movements of rage and how policies vis-à-vis these groups must
by nature be quite distinct from the usual counter-terror type actions.
[T]he Holocaust transformed our whole way of thinking about war and heroism. War is no longer a proving ground for heroism in the same way it used to be. Instead, war now is something that we must avoid at all costs—because genocides often take place under the cover of war. We are no longer all potential soldiers (though we are that too), but we are all potential victims of the traumas war creates. This, at least, is one important development in the way Western populations envision war, even if it does not always predominate in the thinking of our political leaders.Carolyn J. Dean, Interview of February 01, 2011
The dominant premise in evolution and economics is that a person is being loyal to natural law if he or she attends to self’s interest and welfare before being concerned with the needs and demands of family or community. The public does not realize that this statement is not an established scientific principle but an ethical preference. Nonetheless, this belief has created a moral confusion among North Americans and Europeans because the evolution of our species was accompanied by the disposition to worry about kin and the collectives to which one belongs.Jerome Kagan, Interview of September 17, 2009
Lastly
I am humbled by the fact that the book is already being hailed as a major contribution to our knowledge not only of the global jihad movement but of Middle East politics more generally. While I hope such positive reviews continue, I have three primary goals for this book. First, after four decades of global jihad, and two decades since the attacks on 9/11, I hope this book becomes the “go-to” book on global jihad. For anyone who wants to understand ISIS and al-Qa’ida or similar groups, this is the book they consult first and perhaps last. I hope that it is seen as the best summary study of global jihad for students and the general public to read for years to come. It not only provides the history of global jihad, but also an interpretation of how to best understand that history.
Second, I would like this book to have an impact on the discussions in terrorism studies and broader conversations over political violence concerning the role that the concept of “movements of rage” can play in understanding certain forms of political violence. Conceptualizing such anti-Enlightenment groups as forming a movement of rage can help us more accurately understand the ideologies and organizational structures of such groups, as well as their likely resort to violence.
Third, this book should have an impact in the policy realm, where dealing with global jihad groups and other movements of rage is a major policy concern. Policy makers need to be aware of the variations in global jihad groups, and they need to understand how the current fourth wave of global jihad is quite distinctive from earlier waves. Helping to gauge the overall level of threat from global jihad flows naturally from the concerns in this book. And, moving beyond global jihad groups, policy makers should be aware of the concept of movements of rage and how policies vis-à-vis these groups must by nature be quite distinct from the usual counter-terror type actions.