In Global Jihad I make two unique arguments. First, I
provide an interpretive history of this important movement by showing how there
have been four distinct iterations, or “waves”, of global jihad since it began
in the 1980s. Each wave had its own distinct crisis that initiated it, and its
own peculiar ideological vision for the path ahead. In each case, the
fundamental problem was seen as systemic to the international system, which is
why they are examples of global jihad.
The first wave, in response to the Soviet invasion and
occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s, focused on liberating occupied Muslim
territory around the world; it was led by a pious warrior class I term a “Jihadi
International”.
The second wave, led by Usama Bin Laden and al-Qa’ida, sought
to drive the Americans out of the Middle East as part of an “America First” campaign
that would lead to the easier overthrow of local apostate regimes.
ISIS’s state-building campaign, the third wave, sought to
eliminate apostasy by creating a puritanical and globalized caliphate in the
heart of the Middle East.
The fourth and current wave of global jihad is focused on
the survival of global jihad through “jihad fardi”—personal terror
attacks undertaken by individuals and small groups who are connected online by
a shared ideology but whose attacks are autonomously orchestrated. This form of
“stochastic terror” was initiated by white nationalists who, with the birth of
the internet, realized they could influence and connect with the audience
without ever having any logistical connection in the planning and execution of
violent acts. Global jihadis have made full use of this “inspired terrorism”,
the acts of which are stitched together in an ever-evolving wiki-narrative
by an online jihadi community.
The second big argument I make is to situate global jihad in
the universe of all violent political groups over the past century. I borrow
and build on the theory of “movements of rage” to suggest that there is a
unique form of political violence that is marked by calls to nihilistic
violence and that adopt apocalyptic ideologies. Both religious and secular
groups can constitute movements of rage, from global jihad to white
nationalism. Movements of rage are usually small and weak, and rarely come to
power. But when they do seize power, such as the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, the
results can be devastating.
Readers primarily interested in the history of global jihad from
the 1980s to the present can focus on the Introduction and first four chapters.
Those mostly interested in the current wave of global jihad can focus on
Chapter Four, Personal Jihad, in which a networked system using
the internet and social media has replaced old-fashioned organizations
to make for a much more durable form of violence. And for those readers more
attuned to scholarly arguments about terrorism and other forms of political
violence, the concluding chapter on movements of rage will hold the most
interest.
[T]he Holocaust transformed our whole way of thinking about war and heroism. War is no longer a proving ground for heroism in the same way it used to be. Instead, war now is something that we must avoid at all costs—because genocides often take place under the cover of war. We are no longer all potential soldiers (though we are that too), but we are all potential victims of the traumas war creates. This, at least, is one important development in the way Western populations envision war, even if it does not always predominate in the thinking of our political leaders.Carolyn J. Dean, Interview of February 01, 2011
The dominant premise in evolution and economics is that a person is being loyal to natural law if he or she attends to self’s interest and welfare before being concerned with the needs and demands of family or community. The public does not realize that this statement is not an established scientific principle but an ethical preference. Nonetheless, this belief has created a moral confusion among North Americans and Europeans because the evolution of our species was accompanied by the disposition to worry about kin and the collectives to which one belongs.Jerome Kagan, Interview of September 17, 2009
In a nutshell
In Global Jihad I make two unique arguments. First, I provide an interpretive history of this important movement by showing how there have been four distinct iterations, or “waves”, of global jihad since it began in the 1980s. Each wave had its own distinct crisis that initiated it, and its own peculiar ideological vision for the path ahead. In each case, the fundamental problem was seen as systemic to the international system, which is why they are examples of global jihad.
The first wave, in response to the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s, focused on liberating occupied Muslim territory around the world; it was led by a pious warrior class I term a “Jihadi International”.
The second wave, led by Usama Bin Laden and al-Qa’ida, sought to drive the Americans out of the Middle East as part of an “America First” campaign that would lead to the easier overthrow of local apostate regimes.
ISIS’s state-building campaign, the third wave, sought to eliminate apostasy by creating a puritanical and globalized caliphate in the heart of the Middle East.
The fourth and current wave of global jihad is focused on the survival of global jihad through “jihad fardi”—personal terror attacks undertaken by individuals and small groups who are connected online by a shared ideology but whose attacks are autonomously orchestrated. This form of “stochastic terror” was initiated by white nationalists who, with the birth of the internet, realized they could influence and connect with the audience without ever having any logistical connection in the planning and execution of violent acts. Global jihadis have made full use of this “inspired terrorism”, the acts of which are stitched together in an ever-evolving wiki-narrative by an online jihadi community.
The second big argument I make is to situate global jihad in the universe of all violent political groups over the past century. I borrow and build on the theory of “movements of rage” to suggest that there is a unique form of political violence that is marked by calls to nihilistic violence and that adopt apocalyptic ideologies. Both religious and secular groups can constitute movements of rage, from global jihad to white nationalism. Movements of rage are usually small and weak, and rarely come to power. But when they do seize power, such as the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, the results can be devastating.
Readers primarily interested in the history of global jihad from the 1980s to the present can focus on the Introduction and first four chapters. Those mostly interested in the current wave of global jihad can focus on Chapter Four, Personal Jihad, in which a networked system using the internet and social media has replaced old-fashioned organizations to make for a much more durable form of violence. And for those readers more attuned to scholarly arguments about terrorism and other forms of political violence, the concluding chapter on movements of rage will hold the most interest.